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This introduction to a forthcoming NBER volume on "The Internationalization of Equity
Markets"argues that the existing fmance literature has in some respects not kept pacewith world
trends. Most empiricalstudiesfail to take due accountof the diversity of assets offeredby
countriesaround the world, the diversity of locales in which investors live, and the diversity of
institutional peculiarities that characterize the markets in which assets and investors are brought
together. Four of the papers in the volume are econometric studies of asset pricing and home-
country bias in internationally integrated equitymarkets.The otherfour examinesuch issues as








THEINTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS: INTRODUCTION
The internationalization of equity markets encompasses the intersection of three
important trends, The first trend is relevant even to the United States, where, as in the
United Kingdom, equity markets have long been a dominant part of the financial system.
Here the trend is increasing in.regra:ion with the rest of the world, as American investors
look abroad,foreigninvestors buy U.S. equities, and prices on the New York Stock
Exchange become increasingly linked with those in London, Tokyo and around the world.
By 1993, for example, American holdings of foreign stocks had reached $210 billion, more
than double the level of 1990.
The second trend is particularly relevant to countries such as Japan, Germany and
France, where equity markets have not in the past been as developed or active. It is
securitizazion, defined as increased reliance of the financial system on markets in equities and
bonds at the expense of banks and other financial intermediaries. By 1989, the capitalization
of the stock market in Japan, for example, had surpassed that of the U.S. market.' World
stock market capitalization for developed countries exceeded ten trillion dollars in 1991,
quadruple the nominal level of ten years earlier.
The third trend is particularly relevant to newly industrializing countries, though it,
like the first two trends, can also be identified with other sorts of countries. It is the opening
of national financial systems to international financial flows and institutions, as governments
remove capital controls and other barriers. Foreign purchases of equities from developing
countries were estimated at $9.6 billion in 1992. While this is still small compared to thevolume of gross flowsamong industrializedcountries, it is almost three times the level of
1989, and is bound to play an increasingly important role in the financial development of the
recipientcountries in thefuture.2
Anincreasingly integrated, securitized andopenworld financial system suggests
importantquestions, and offers a rich set of data with which to attempt to answer them.
Some of these questions are new ones raised by the international environment itself. What
are the gains to international diversification, for example, from the viewpoint of a U.S.
investor?To what extent are markets in fact now integrated across countries? Do investors
still exhibit an unexplained home-country bias, despite the degree of globalization that has
taken place? What is the role of the specific times and locations around the world at which
stocks are traded?
Other questions are versions of questions of longstanding interest in the context of
domestic equity markets. Are.the markets efficient? Are expected returns determined in
world markets by variances, covariances, and the price of risk as suggested by the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)? If not, what is the correct alternative model? To answer
these questions, we will also have to ask what is the appropriate international version of
CAPM, or of other models of asset-pricing that have been developed in the domestic
context?
Most less-developed countries have previously been "financially repressed" and
partially closed off from world financial markets. What are the effects when such countries
liberalize and open up to foreign investors? Do the theoretical gains from trade across time
2and across states of nature in fact show up in the data? How can one disentangle the extent
to which fundamental shocks in such economies are independent of those in industrialized
economies (offering a valuable opportunity for diversification) and the extent to which
barriers continue to segment the markets? Have country funds offered an effective first
wedge into markets where barriers still prevent foreign investors from entering freely?
Thesearesome of the questions which this conference seeks to address. Many of
them have until recentlybeen underexplored,sufficiently so that it ispossibleto make
relativelytangible progress.
PARTI: ASSET PRICENG AND HOME COUNTRY BIAS
IN INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED MARKETS
1. Limitations of the Existing Literature
Models of equity-pricinghave been the centerpiece of the finance field over the last
25 years. The literature has continued to develop rapidly in a technical sense. Such
innovations as allowing variation over time in first and second moments of returns (i.e., in
expected rates of return, variances, and covariances), are very important if one hopes to be
able to capture a world of changing realities. In other respects, however, the research has
not entirely kept pace with some of the major phenomena in world markets that need to be
addressed.
Two shortcomings of standard tests of asset-pricing models have been known for a
3long time, but have become even more important as equity marketshavebecome
internationalized. More than fifteen years ago, Richard Roll (1977) emphasized the
importance in tests of CAPM of using as comprehensive a set of assets as possible. Today,
a majority of tests conducted by American researchers leave out other countries' assets
entirely. Other tests conducted by international financial economists often commit the
symmetric sin of concentrating on a sample of countries' bonds, either omitting equities
entirely or else simply adding a single equity index like the Standard and Poor's 500 to the
list of assets. Both approaches blithely omit categories of assets that are some of the most
important in world markets.
A second shortcoming of the standard tests is that Ihey usually measure all returns in
terms of dollars. The implicit assumption is that any asset whose return is fixed in terms of
dollars, such as U.S.deposits,is completely safe, and that the risk of other assets can be
measured by their correlation with the market basket return expressed in dollars. If U.S.
investorswere the only ones whose behavior mattered, this assumption would not be too bad
at short horizons. Because monthly variability in the U.S.consumerprice index is so low --
compared to the variability in the prices of stocks, bonds, and foreign exchange -- the real
value of dollar deposits is almost certain at a horizon of one month or less, from the
viewpoint of American investors.
U.S.investors,however, are not the only ones in the market, either the market for
U.S.stocksor the market for foreign stocks. Just as American investors find dollar. assets
less risky than deutschemark or yen assets, so do Japanese investors find yen assets less risky
and German residents find mark assets less risky. If major stock markets are integrated, then
4the behaviorof each nationality of investors who participate in this integrated global market
is relevant.More precisely,in market equilibrium, each investor nationality should be
weightedby the size of its total portfolio. The weight hasbeen shiftingaway from U.S.
investors.Because U.S.assets abroad are now exceeded byforeigners' assetsin the United
States,itwouldbe morecorrectto oversimplify by assumingthattherepresentativeglobal
investorin world markets is a foreign resident,thanto continue with the old
oversimplification ofassuming that the representativeinvestor isan American.
Ifpurchasing power parity (PPP) held among currencies, the propertestwould be a
simple matter ofidentifyingtheprice index of the appropriateinternational basketof goods
consumedby investors,and measuringasset returns in terms of it.3PPPdoes not hold in
theshortrun, however, not even approximately.Thus,using a single composite
international price index is not much better than using a dollar priceindex.There is little
way around letting investorsofdifferent countriesbehave differently.Wewill use the
phrase "preferred local habitat"torefer to the implication that followsfrom thisfailure of
PPP, the proposition that investors who live in different countries will use different reference
currencies to evaluate what is a safe asset and what is a risky asset.
More than fifteen years after these points were first emphasized,4 very few modern
tests of international asset pricing seriously address them. This refusal by most researchers
to allow investors to live in whatever country they choose seems rather intolerant.
Other kinds of heterogeneity of investors across countries are possible as well. One
can allow investors to have different degrees of risk-aversion, as in Engel's contribution to
this volume, or to have different expectations regarding stock market performance, as in
5French andPoterba(1991). These extensions are probably lower-priority, however, than
allowingfor differences in the consumptionbasket.
The state-of-the-art work of Campbell Harvey (1989, 1991, 1993), alone and together
withWayne Ferson (1993, 1994), addresses some serious shortcomings of the previous
literature. It allows expected returns to vary over time, by conditioning them on a set of
observable instrumental variables, such as dividend yields. It also allows variances to vary
over time, for example by means of the famous ARCH process, introduced by Robert Engle,
and developed in subsequent elaborations, such as Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988).
In the technique of Harvey (1991), variances and covariances are also allowed to vary in a
general way [somewhat analogously to the way first moments are allowed to vary in a
completely unrestricted way in the method used by Charles Engell.
Many researchers have sought refuge from the mundane realities of CAPM tests --
such as the aforementioned difficulty of measuring all assets -- by assuming a world of
representative agents, each of whom maximizes an (identical) interteinporal expected utility
function. The solution is more apparent than real, however, as the theoretical constructs in
such models are often even more difficult to measure empirically. Moreover, a
representative agent model is clearly inappropriate for addressing our second concern,
heterogeneity of investors across countries. Dumas (1993) has considered the prospects for
reconciling this model, which he calls the "orthodox General Equilibrium approach", with
some of the stylized facts of international finance that concern us in this volume: PPP
deviations, home bias in equity preferences, and differences in expected returns across
6countries. He concludes that CAPM, which he calls the "heterodox partial-equilibrium
approach", is more likely to accommodate these stylized facts.
***
2.International Factors and Rates of Return
In recent work,Dumas and Solnik(1993) useinstrumentalvariablessimilar to
Harvey's to condition expected returns, but at the same time seek to move beyond the
assumption that all investors live in the United States, to address the issue of preferred local
habitats. Their technique for choosing between the international and classical versions of
CAPMallows the datato suggest whether the return on a country's equities is determined by
puttingweighton correlations with individual currencies, or solely by the correlation with
the aggregatemarket portfolio. InChapter2 of thisvolume, Dumas extends this approach in
thedirection of addressing what Iwillcall the Summers ketchup critique.
LarrySummers (1985)registeredacomplaintwith researchin finance:that it spends
all its energies testing, essentially, whether the price of one-quartketchup bottles bearsthe
hypothesized relationship to the price of one-pint ketchup bottles. Summers was referringto
thehabitof testing the relationship between the firstmomentofstockreturnsandthe second
moment of stock returns, with no other data beyond stock prices entering the analysis. [One
might add that the practice of using lagged stock returns as instrumental variables does little
to reduce the circularity.] In a study of the ketchup market, one would hope to explain the
price of ketchup in terms of such factors as wages, the price of tomatoes, the income of
7consumers, the price of hamburgers, the price of mustard, etc. Similarly, argues Summers,
one would hope to be able to explain stock returns in terms of fundamental economic
variables.
The Dumas study appearing here dispenses with the variables internal to the financial
markets, such as dividend/price ratios, that others have relied on to predict returns. Instead,
indicators of real economic activity are used as instrumental variables: for example, housing
start authorizations, increases in manufacturing inventories, and the percent of companies
reporting slower deliveries, and other variables found by Stock and Watson (1992) to be
important in predicting real activity. Viewed in the light of the Summers ketchup critique of
the circularity of the standard approach, the Dumas study is a commendable attempt to relate
international equity returns to real economic variables. This line of inquiry is useful even if
the real economic variables do not predict returns as well as do the financial variables,
although one is reassured to see that these instruments have at least some statistical power.
Dumas then tests the international conditional CAPM against the classic conditional CAPM
and statistically does not reject the former. He also tests the classic conditional CAPM
(against an unspecified alternative), and reject it; so the reader's prior beliefs regarding
CAPMwill affectthe way he or she wishes to interpret the findings.
Chapter 3 in this volume provides Ferson and Harvey's latest contribution to tests of
international asset-pricing. They seek to bridge the gap between state-of-the-art finance and
practitioners who engage in "asset-allocation" based on whatever observable variables seem
to be useful for picking stocks.
$Like Adler and Dumas (1983) and Dumas and Solnik (1992), they assume that returns
on individual assets will be related not only to the return on a world market portfolio (the
MorganStanleyCapital International index), but also to the return on holding a portfolio of
GlOcurrencies. Ferson andHarveyinterpret thetwo coefficients as betas, one on the world
stock market portfolio and one on the currency portfolio, and let them vary over time as
functions of certain attributes of the national equity markets. The idea is that attributes of
the national markets should predict the cross section of future returns only to the extent that
differences in the attributes across countries measure differences in the betas. Ferson and
Harvey model the betas as functions of three groups of attributes: (1) valuation ratios, such
as price-to-book value and price-to-cash-flow, (2) industrial structure, and (3) economic
performance measures, such as relative GNP growth and relative inflation.
They test whether these betas are statistically related to expected returns on the assets
in question, against a number of ad hoc alternative hypotheses. They do not, however, focus
explicitly on second moments to test whether a higher level of risk on an asset requires a
higher expected return to induce investors willingly to hold that asset -- as in classic tests of
CAPM.The propositionthat predictable components of returns must be risk premia is
assumed rather than tested.6 This approach has become the norm in models of risk.7 As
Bruce Lehman notes, yesterday's 'anomalies" of predictability became today's risk
premiums. (Possible alternative interpretations of predictability are considered below, in Part
IL]
There is always a concern that a test of CAPM is not meaningful because one cannot
actually measure the correct benchmark portfolio. The concern has given rise to a tradition
9of adding in whatever additional factors the researcher thinks might be useful in explaining
returns. Ferson and Harvey(1993, 1994) have foundoil prices, OECD industrial
production, and OECD inflation rates useful in past work, but do not get very far with them
here. The coefficients in cross-sectional regressions of returns on lagged attributes, which
should be the factor premia if the attributes measure betas, are only weakly related to
premiums for these global risk factors. Person and Harvey's tests do suggest that the
attributes may be useful for modelling the world equity market and the currency portfolio.
Findings that returns on some countries' stocks are related to observable economic factors
will always be of interest to practitioners.
.**
3.Testsofthe International CAPM and Home Country Bias
The contributions to this conference by Engel and by TesarandWerner test the
internationalCAPM witha technique that addresses many of the limitations of the existing
literature.tLike thestate-of-the-artfinancetests, Engel's test in Chapter4allows
conditional expected returns to vary over time.Unlike thesetests, however, the "CASE
method"[ConstrainedAsset Share Estimation) does not require that the information set on
which investors condition their expectations be limited to a handful of variables observed by
the econometrician. Rather, investors' expectations, regardless on what they are based, can
be inferred from their observed asset holdings. Asset stock measures do not have to be
introduced extraneously; they are already implicitly present in the standard CAPM measure
10of the return on the overall market portfolio that everyone uses, as the weights that are used
to aggregate individual assets' returns.
The downside of the technique, as Engel admits, is that the second moments must be
modeled in an ad hoc way reminiscent of how other studies model the first moments.
Variances and covariances must be assumed either to follow some sort of ARCH or GARCH
process or to be related to lagged values of observable economic variables, if they are not
assumed constant altogether.9 Of course the same is true of other tests.
A second advantage of the CASE method is that the null hypothesis of international
conditional CAPM is tested against interesting explicit alternative hypotheses. Most notably,
it affords a natural test of CAPM against the Tobin model in which investors balance their
portfolios across assets as general functions of expected returns, without necessarily
diversifying optimally. One must conclude that this particular alternative hypothesis is of
more interest to economists than to finance specialists, however, given the gulf that appears
between the two strands in the literature. Other alternative hypotheses that one could
imagine, and that are considered by other contributors to the volume, include market
segmentation, noise trading, and the possbility that ex ante returns cannot in finite samples
reliably be inferred from ex post realizations.
A third important advantage is that Engel allows his investors to live in whatever
country they choose, like Dumas-Solnik (1993) but unlike most tests. In other words,
residents of each country are allowed to have their own asset preferences, and their asset
demands are then added up to arrive at the overall market equilibrium. This trick is
accomplished by using cumulated data on countries' current account positions, measuring
11their net investment positions vis-a-vis each other. For example Japan's wealth increases at
the expense of America's, when the former runs a current account surplus and the latter a
current account deficit.
One of the nested hypotheses tested by Engel, his Model 3, seeks to dispense with the
data on national wealths by assuming them constant and allowing their levels to be estimated
endogenously. His Model 3 is in fact somewhat like the famous equation 14 of Adler and
Dumas (1983), as tested for example by Dumas and Solnik (1992) or reproduced here as
equation 1.1 in Dumas' chapter. (The main difference is that Dumas estimates betas in the
traditional first step of a two-step method, while Engel imposes the CASE constraint in a
single estimation procedure. This is a constraint of proportionality between the coefficients
in the expected return equation, on the one hand, and the variance-covariance matrix of the
error term in the same equation, on the other hand.) Engel finds that his Model 3 performs
the worst of all the models he tests. Evidently it is necessary to allow for the fact that
countries' shares of world wealth do in fact change over time.
Engel's results offer some relatively clear verdicts on some hypotheses that have
been widely pondered. First, he does not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of risk-
aversion is equal across countries (Model 2 in section IV of the chapter). The estimated
coefficient of relative risk aversion is approximately 4.0. Second, the special case of ARCH
is rejected against the more general GARCH.
Especially noteworthy are the verdicts on some of the hypotheses that are central to
the goals of this conference. There is weak evidence (i.e., at approximately the tenpercent
significance level; see Section V of the chapter) that the international CAPM has some ability
12to predict expected returns.'0Investorheterogeneity appears to be key to the relative
successof severalversions of the model." Ultimately, however, Engel again rejects the
CAPM,becausetheheterogeneity observedin the data isnot quiteof the right sort.
Previousresults have sounded negative for the international CAPM, but they have
been on less firm ground than Engel's. A failure to reject the hypothesis that expected
returns are equalized internationally, within the CAPM framework, sounds like bad news for
the model;buta failure to reject does not allow one to claim a positive finding.Arejection
of CAPM against the more genera] Tobin alternative also sounds like bad news, but again is
somewhat less compelling if the Tobin alternative itself hasnoexplanatory power for
expectedreturns.By paying due attention to a full international arrayofassets andcountries
ofresidence,Engel hasbeenable to reject the constraints of the international CAPMin favor
of a more general alternative that has a particular claim on our interest. Thatalternative,
the portfolio balance model with anallowance forpreferred localhabitats, hasaparticular
claimon ourinterestbecause it seems to be the only model that has predictive power for
asset returns empirically, and at the same time follows from a widely-used theory.'2
Tesar and Werner in Chapter 5 have a more directwayof addressing the failure of
the standard tests of CAPM to allow diversity of investor residence. They work with data on
purchases of assets from the balance of payments capital accounts of major countries.
Previousresearchershavevirtuallyignored these data. Large measurement errors in the
balanceof paymentsdataare part ofthe explanation. Neverthelessthere ismuch tobe
learned from the data, even with its imperfections, andtheauthors are to be commended for
13undertaking this line of research. A good example of the issues that are difficult to analyze
without the balance of payments data is precisely the hypothesis of optimal diversification by
investors of differing nationalities.
After exploring various patterns in the data, Tesar and Werner use the same technique
as Engel to Lest CAPM. Instead of
aggregating across investors in different countries of residence, however, they make use of
their balance of payments data to examine the behavior of individual nationalities. In the last
section of this paper, they concentrate on the asset demands of U.S. investors, due to greater
data availability than for other countries. Their test is necessarily only a test of mean-
variance efficiency of the portfolios held by American residents, rather than a test of the
international CAPM hypothesis; but since the latter hypothesis amounts to the proposition
that all important investors in the marketplace hold portfolios characterized by mean-variance
efficiency, a test of Americans' behavior is certainly a useful piece of information. Like
Erigel, they are able to reject conditional mean-variance efficiency, against the more general
Tobin alternative.
A major motivation for the volume, and especially for Tesar and Werner, is a puzzle
that seems likely also to be connected with the statistical rejection of the international
CAPM.Investorswho reside in different countries are thought to exhibit a bias toward
holding home assets. French and Poterba (1991),C3olub (1991), andTesarandWerner
(1993) find that there is such a bias in portfolios actually held, notwithstanding the widely
noted progress already made in recent years toward the globalization of equity markets.
(The data used by Tesar and Werner (1993) for this purpose are the same sort that they use
14in their contribution to the present volume.) In 1989, U.S.investorsreportedly held 94 per
cent of their stock-marketwealth in domestic stocks, Japanese investors held 98 percent, and
U.K. investors held 82 per cent. In 1990, pension funds in G-7 countries continued to hold
more than 90 per cent of their assets domestically." Why do they not each hold more of
each others' equities2'4
One can readily explain a substantial home-country bias in investors' holdings of
short-term bonds, as opposed to equities. The explanation is rational preferences for local
currency habitats. Assume a simple model of investors' portfolio allocations based on one-
period mean-variance optimization (which is the CAPM). Assume further that goods prices
are predetermined in the currency of the country where the good is produced, over a horizon
as long as the maturity of the bond. Calculating the optimal portfolio for a given investor,
even approximately, is very difficult because of sensitivity to expected rates of return, which
are difficult to measure precisely. Calculating the difference between optimal portfolios held
by domestic and foreign residents is much easier, however, assuming that both share the
same expectations (and, for simplicity, the same coefficient of risk-aversion, as in Engel's
results). The reason is that the expectations component of the optimal portfolio share drops
out of the difference.
Let x4 be the share of their portfolio that Americans allocate to U.S. assets and x0 the
share of their portfolios that Germans allocate to U.S. assets. Then it can be shown that
4G =[a4-aJ[1-IIp],
wherea4 and a0 are the shares of their consumption that optimally-diversified American and
German residents, respectively, allocate to U.S. goods, and p is the coefficient of relative
15risk-aversion.'5 Intuitively, to the extent that investors are relatively risk-averse (p >1),
they differ in their portfolio preferences in simple proportion to how they differ in their
consumption preferences. The term representing the home-country bias in consumption, aA -
a3,is certainly large in practice. Assume for simplicity that it takes its maximum value of 1-
o= 1.Let us try a value for the coefficient of risk-aversion that emerges from Engel's
estimates: 4. It follows that the measure of home country bias is relatively large: XA-=
.75. Ifresidents of each country in fact hold a mere 10 or 15 per cent of their portfolios in
foreign bonds (.85-. 15 =.70<.75),that is fully consistent with optimal diversification!
At first glance, home country bias poses no puzzle.
The puzzle arises in a portfolio that includes equities. To a first approximation, the
return on equities is determined as a random draw in the currency of the home country (i.e.,
in practice this return has a surprisingly low correlation with the exchange rate). There is a
substantial correlation of equity returns across countries; Ito and Lin's contribution to this
conference constitutes the latest piece of evidence on how stock market movements are
transmitted from one country to another. The correlation is far from 1, however, which is of
course the reason why international equity investment offers a valuable opportunity to
diversify.
The key point is that exchange rate risk is not ax' impediment to holding foreign
equities in the way that it is an impediment to holding foreign bonds. Once investors have
given vent to the home-country bias that optimally follows from differences in consumption
patterns, in the form of bond portfolios that are relatively undiversified, there is little reason
for their equity portfolios to exhibit the samehome-country bias. Rather, in theory,
16American investors shouldtake advantage of the opportunity to diversify by holding
approximatelythe same amount of German equities as German residents hold. They can
easily eliminate the gratuitous exchange risk by reducing their holdings of German bonds
correspondingly or, equivalently, by selling marks on the forward market. (The prescription
to hold foreign equities but hedge the exchange risk has been offered to portfolio-managers
as a "free lunch."'6)
Clearly, investors' equity portfolios are in fact less diversified than this. In a
framework that allows investors of each country to diversify among countries' stocks and
bonds as they will, rejection of the CAPM constraint might be attributed to its implication
that investors should exhibit home-country bias only in their bonds, not in their stocks.'7
Tesar and Werner, certainly, infer that there is a significant home country bias puzzle —
whichcannot be explained by transactions costs --fromtheir evidence that investors trade a
lot on the small fraction of the portfolio that they dedicate to foreign assets. They find that
gross transactions volumes are very large compared to the magnitude of the corresponding
net transactions volume.
***
17PART H: EMERGING MARKETS, TRADING VOLUME, LOCATION,
TAXES,CONTROLS, AND 0THER IMPERFECTIONS
Wehave seen that the tests, even those that make full allowance for the range of
international assets to be held and the range of countries where investors live, seem
consistently to reject the international CAPM hypothesis. Why? One possibility is that
investors are sophisticated and markets are efficient, but CAPM does not hold because the
assumptions on which the simple one-period mean-variance framework depends are not
justified. The alternative possibility is that international equity markets fall short, in one way
or another, of the ideal of a perfectly-integrated efficient market where rationally expected
returns correctly price risk and investors are able to optimize fully. There are (at least) three
ways that markets could fall short of the ideal, all involving an extra degree of heterogeneity
arising from such factors as imperfect information. Investor heterogeneity must always be
with us; otherwise it would be difficult to explain the high volume of transactions in the
equities markets. But it arises more forcefully in a global context than in the domestic
context. I have in mind an extra degree of heterogeneity beyond the mere fact of different
national consumption baskets considered above.
First, integration may still be far from perfect, due to remaining taxes, regulations,
legal differences, and imperfect transmittal of information across countries, segmenting some
countries' markets from the world market. Such barriers may be the explanation for
observed home-country bias. Second, because markets are not perfectly liquid, there may be
a relevant dichotomy between "liquidity traders" and "informed traders". Third, in a world
18of imperfect information, some investors may make worse use of the available information
than others. So-called "noise traders' may undergo waves of optimism or pessimism
regarding investments in particular countries. Each of these three possibilities would be a
departure from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. They each play a role in the second half
of the volume.
***
1. Segmentation and Emerging Markets
Imperfectintegration, as a deviation from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, is a
possibility even in the case of industrialized countries. Japan, for example, had heavy
restrictions on foreign stock ownership as recently as 1979, and legal and information
differences may still be disinducements to cross-border investment.
imperfect integration is most evident, however, in the case of less developed
countries. Many LDCs have undergone financial liberalization in recent years, spurring a
boom in emerging markets. As these countries remove explicit bathers to cross-border
investment, they incidentally provide us with convenient experimental data on which to try
out tests of segmentation vs. integration. This underexplored area promises much exciting
research.'9
Studies of the extent of segmentation have been challenged by the difficulty of
disentangling the implications of barriers to integration from the implications of independent
economic shocks across countries. While the extent of independence of shocks provides an
19important incentive forcross-border investments andtheextent of barriers provides an
importantobstacle, both can show up empirically in the same way: as a relatively low
correlation between emerging markets and markets in industrialized countries. One approach
is to divide countries into sub-samples, according to whether their markets are known to be
open. Usually, however, liberalization is more of a gradual continuous process, rather than
A one-time complete event.
Claessens and Rhee, in Chapter 6, study the process of opening by less developed
countries, by making use of some interesting new indexes on the degree of foreign
"investability," computed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). They build on a
standard test of segmentation in which returns on a countries' equities could either obey
CAPM vis-a-vis the world market portfolio (if the markets are integrated) or vis-a-vis the
domestic portfolio alone (if markets are segmented). They reject the hypothesis of complete
integration for 10 out of 16 countries. For most of the countries they are not able to reject
the opposite polar case of complete segmentation. On the other hand, their results are
favorable to intógration for more countries than has been the case in past studies on pre-1988
data sets, suggesting that the degree of integration has increased over time.
They then test an equation in which individual returns are determined by the world
market beta plus the extra local portfolio beta in;eracted with the IFC investability index
(which runs on a scale from 0 to 1). This seems like a test well-specified to distinguish the
effects of segmentation from the inherent correlation of countries' economic disturbances.
Yet the results are poor. Only when they look for an effect of the investability index on the
jj of price/earnings ratios, as opposed to the rate of return, do they find statistically
20significant effects: The higher is a country'sdegree of investability,the greater is the
effectivedemand for its stocks andthehigher their prices.
Claessens andRhee suspect that the source of their difficulty in finding meaningful
effectson rates of return is that ex post price changes are a very noisy indicator of ex ante
expectations.Specifically, ifa country startsoffwith some degree of segmentation, andthen
liberalizes during the sample period, itsequityprices should riseatthesametime.Investors
inthis country will have experienced capital gains during the sample period, as compared to
another country that retains a high level ofcapitalcontrols throughout. The first country
shows a higher return during the sample, even though the ex ante required rate of return
should in theory be higher in the second country. The lesson is that small-sample statistical
tests that are implicitly based on an assumption of stationary structure are likely to go awry if
used to study a period of structural change. This is an example of a failure of the rational
expectations methodology, as distinct from the hypothesis of rational expectations or efficient
markets perSe, thatplagues much empirical work throughout the finance field.
* S*
5. TheLocationand Volume of Trading
Usually in the study ofequity markets,we abstractfromissues regardingthevolume
of trading and the locationofthe trading. It is interesting to reflect, however, that the
volumeofthe day's equity transactions in London,NewYork or Tokyo is the economic
statisticthat theaudienceof theCNN network and other information outlets apparently finds
thesecond-mostimportant of any. (Most-reportedisthe day's change inthe stock market
2!price index.)
What determines whether a given trade takes place in one financial center or another?
The location of the financial industry is not deeply rooted in fundamentals of comparative
advantage. In Chapter 7, Campbell and Froot study the role of taxes on securities
transactions. They examine two kinds of taxes: one in effect in Sweden, which is essentially
a tax on domestic brokerage services, and another in effect in the United Kingdom, which is
a tax on the legal transfer of ownership of UK equities. They find that both kinds of taxes
lead to significant responses in the form of a fall in domestic trading. The response can
involve either a shift of the same transactions offshore [though this is not an option in the
UK case], a substitution into other similar (but untaxed) assets, or a decline in trading
altogether.
Such research naturally has important implications for the securities industry itself,
and potentially for public policy as well. The motivation of countries with securities
transactions taxes is usually simply to raise revenue. The Swedish tax might be considered
successful if its goal were to reduce the "excessive income" of securities traders. The UK
tax might be considered successful if its goal weretoreduce the volume of trading in
particular UK assets, e.g., under the theory that "excessive trading" leads to "excessive
volatility." Campbell and From conclude, however, that proposals to tax securities
transactions as a source of tax revenue are less likely to be successful, unless perhaps the
taxes can be imposed worldwide so as to prevent traders from shifting offshore.
The transactions tax experiment shows that relatively large shifts in the location of
trading can result from relatively small changes in the cost of trading. [Similar implications
22presumably follow from other elements of trader costs, such as rents, telecommunications
costs, andsalariesof lawyers and translators.] The conclusion does not rule out the
possibility, however, thatthe location and volumeof trading are irrelevant to the
determination of securities prices, beyond the epsilon-width band of arbitrage created by such
costs. If location and trading. volume are to have broader implications for securities prices, it
is likely that imperfect information will have to play a role. It is considered below.
***
Timingaround the globe, for example the closing of New York markets at 4:00 p.m.
(EST) and the opening of Tokyo markets approximately three or four hours later (9:30 a.m.
Japan time), offers a natural experiment to help answer a number of questions. Several
researchers have noted the strengthened links between foreign markets and the U.S. market,
particularly in the October 1987 crash and subsequently.2° In Chapter 8 of this volume, Ito
and Lin focus on the interrelation of price movements, volatility clusters, and trading
volumes, between the New York and Tokyo markets. They consider trading volume a
possible proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, since investors would not trade if all were identical.
This study makes a contribution to the literature on correlation across markets, by testing
under what circumstances the correlation is higher than others. It also makes a contribution
to the literature on trading volumes, by testing the effects from one market to the next.
Ito and Lin consider two competing hypotheses regarding correlation across markets.
The first is that markets are imperfectly liquid, so that when a "liquidity trader" wishes to
23sell a stockin a hurry, he or she isobliged togiveup abit ofreturn,whichgoesto the other
class of traders["informed traders"] as compensation. A testable implication ofthis
hypothesisis attributedto Campbell, GrossmanandWang (1993): that a temporaryupsurge
intradingvolumeshould cause a temporary decreaseinreturns, followed by a rebound in the
subsequentperiod (i.e., negativeautocorrelation).Ito and Liii, however, after looking in
vainfor evidencethattrading volumeinNew York has a negative effect on the correlation
between the New York and Tokyo markets, do not favor this hypothesis.
The competinghypothesisis that Japanese traders correctly infer from New York
price movements information that is relevant to the pricing of their own stocks. Ito and Liii
find that the correlation across the markets goes up when the volatility in New York goes up,
which they think may be evidence in favor of this second hypothesis. It is surprising,
however, that the authors find no evidence that volatilityinTokyo is associatedwith
volatility in New York, as they have found in earlier work on the foreign exchange
market.2' There is room for more researchonthe interaction of these variables. The use
of direct data on the dispersion of beliefs among traders, as measured by the standard
deviation of survey responses, might help.
,**
6. Country Funds and Investor Sentiment
Most economists and finance specialists have long found unattractive the hypothesis
that an important fraction of investors do not make full use of available information. After a
24decade of researchintoobserved"anomalies"andsomehard-to--explain upswings and
crashes, however, there hasrecentlybeen more seriousconsideration ofthe possible roleof
suchfactorsasfads, bubbles, Thoise traders," "feedbacktraders," etc..
Hardouvelis, La Porn, and Wizman make a fascinating contribution to the volume in
their study of country funds in Chapter 9. These hinds are well worth studying in theft own
right, as the leading wedge into some countries' emerging markets. By December 1992,
U.S.investorscould buy into twenty-six countries through one or more country funds traded
on the NYSEandAMEX.Thefunds also offer a remarkable opportunity for one of the
clearest tests to date of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis vs. the hypothesis that noise traders
are important.
It is always difficult to test whether the market price of a stock is equal to its
fundamental value, because of the uncertainty regarding what is the correct model of the
fundamental value. There is little doubt, however, that the market price of a fixed portfolio
of equities ought to be equal to the net asset value of the portfolio, that is, the aggregate of
the market prices of the individual stocks. Closed—end country funds are just such fixed
portfolios, and yet their prices when traded in New York are observed to differ substantially
from theft net asset values expressed in dollars.
Previous authors have observed the discrepancy between county funds and their
respective net asset values! Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman study how it moves
through time. To summarize briefly the outcome of a systematic and thorough analysis, the
New York prices of country funds are observed in the short run to behave far more like the
New York prices of other U.S. securities than to behave like the aggregated net asset value
25of the individual foreign securities that constitute the portfolio. Specifically,whenthere is a
fluctuationin the exchange rate between the dollar and the currency ofthe localcountry in
question, the country fund price tends in the short run to follow the dollar, not the local
currency. When there is a fluctuation in the price of the world stock market, or small U.S.
stocks, again the country fund price tends in the short run to follow the world portfolio or
the U.S. stocks, not its respective local national stock market. Only slowly over time does
the price converge to the net asset value as it should right away. (The weekly autoregressive
coefficient is estimated at .89, for a half-life of five weeks.) It is difficult to reconcile this
behavior with the hypothesis of an efficient and frictionless world capital market.
Hardouvelis, La Port, and Wizman interpret the data in terms of a model that allows
for the presence of irrational investors, or noise traders. Collectively, these investors swing
between being under- and over-optimistic about investment opportunities in particular foreign
countries. In this context, the discount or premium on a country fund becomes a measure of
the spontaneous pessimism or optimism with which U.S. investors view the country in
question, relative to the investors within that same country.
Moreover, the common component of country fund discounts or premia across all
New York-traded funds becomes an aggregate measure of general U.S. sentiment for all
foreign countries, relative to local sentiment. A widespread interpretation of the specific
timing of the 1982 international debt crisis is that domestic investors in such heavily-indebted
regions as Latin America became concerned about future prospects of their countries, and
moved large amounts of money out, at a time when northern investors were still
enthusiastically lending. As one observes the renewed surge of capital into less developed
26countries during the period 1990-93, therefore, one should consider whether it is based on a
degree of enthusiasm among northern investors that is not shared by the locals, who may be
better-informed. 1-Tardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman observe a shift from discount to
premium in 1990 in the prices of many country funds, which they attribute to contagious
enthusiasm beginning with the fail of the Berlin Wall. It is interesting to note that discounts
have particularly diminished or disappeared in Latin America and Central Europe since 1990.
[In East Asia, on the other hand, premiums have fallen since 1990, suggesting that their
stock market booms may have been led by domestic investors, rather than by foreigners.]
One possible interpretation is that discounts and premiums are diminishing everywhere as
restrictions are removed and the markets become more efficient. Another, more
troublesome, interpretation is that U.S.investorsmay in 1990 have entered a temporary
wave of enthusiasm for countries in Latin America and Central Europe.
Inanyease, the broader lesson to be drawn from the country fund study by
Hardouvelis,LaPorta,andWizman,is thesame as that to be drawnfromthe other
contributions to this conference. International equity markets offer a wealth of new data,
unique questions, and useful answers. Empirical studies should not merely treat foreign
equities as one more asset to be added to the menu of investments considered by insular U.S.
residents. They should, rather, take due account of the diversity of assets offered by
countries around the world, the diversity of locales in which the universe of investors live,
and the diversity of institutional peculiarities that characterize the markets in which assets
and investors are brought together.
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Notes
1.Thecross-over appears to have occurred earlier, if one does not adjust the Japanese
stockmarket for cross-holdings. Using either basis of comparison, the U.S. market regained
the lead soon thereafter.
2. ClaessensandRhee, this volume. A third of the flow over the four-year period took
place via countryfunds.
3.A classicreference that follows thisapproachis Grauer,Litzenbergerand Stehle (1976).
4.Solnik(1977) first modeled investors in each country as caring only about returns
expressed in their own country's terms, because they consume no foreign goods and domestic
goods prices are non-stochastic. The more general framework in which investors have a
home-country bias based on consumption patterns (the 'preferred local habitat" model) was
developed by Kouri and de Macedo (1978), Dornbusch (1983) and Frankel (1982) in the
economics literature, and Stulz (1981a) and Adler and Dumas (1983), a classic survey, in the
finance literature.
5. They cite Stulz (1984) for the conditions under which a single-beta CAPM based on a
world market portfolio holds.
6.Harvey(1989) tests the proposition.
7.Manyresearchers follow the strategy of, first, developing a complete intertemporal
optimization theory, and then --whenit comes time to test, and the empirical counterparts of
the theoretical "state variables" are nowhere to be found —adoptingconvenient observable
variables as proxies.
8.Someof these attractions were also claimed by the tests in Frankel (1982, 1983, 1985)
and Frankel and Engel (1983). But the technique has in the past included only a limited set
of assets --thusbeing subject to the Roll critique. Furthermore, the four papers cited also
required that the variances and covariances be constant over time.
9. The GARCH version of the CASE method has also been tested by Engel and Rodrigues
(1989), and Engel, Frankel, Froot, and Rodrigues (1991). The application of the technique
by Giovannini and Jorion (1989) added the U.S. stock market to the set of international
bonds considered in the earlier papers, and conditioned variances on the level of interest
rates. Like the earlier papers, it rejected the CAPM hypothesis. Engel and Rodrigues
(1993) included a range of countries' stock markets, and conditioned variances on a set of
economic variables like some of the instrumental variables used in the Dumas and Ferson-
Harvey contributions to the present volume.
3210. A great many researchers have found an ability to predict expected return differentials
using ad hoc predictors. Wi/hinthe constraints of CA I'M, however,previous tests such as
Frankel (1982) and Giovannini and Jorion (1989) have been unable to reject the hypothesis
that expected returns are equalized across countries. Engel suggests that this may be due to
the failure to consider a full set of bonds and equities, or to allow the variances to vary.
11. Thomas and Wickens (1993) apply the CASE method to a portfolio of four countries'
bonds and equities. They obtain a rejection of CAPM, like the earlier studies cited in
lootnotes 6 and 7 and other applications of the technique. Their study has all the advantages
of Engel's -- a reasonably complete international set of assets, time-varying variances,
conditional expected returns that can vary freely, an explicit test of CAPM against an
alternative hypothesis -- except that it is missing investor heterogeneity.
12 . Once again, the portfolio-balance theory has traditionally been of greater interest to
economists than to Finance specialists. Branson and Henderson (1985) is one survey of the
portfolio balance model, with emphasis on the finance perspective. A recent example is
Brainard and Tobin (1992).
13. Jorion, this volume.
14. Recent surveys by Dumas (1993) and Obstfcld (1993) each devote sections to this
observed bias and its possible explanations.
15. One of many possible examples is Frankcl (1983), equations (I) and (3).
16. Perold and Schulman (1988). This prescription, and many of the other conclusions that
follow from the one-period mean-variance model, change if investors are obliged to take into
consideration longer horizons. See Froot (1993).
17. Enel tests the version of the international CAPM that does not allow any home-country
bias in equities whatsoever, which is a particularly extreme version of the model, the Solnik
form, in which investors are assumed to consider the home currency completely safe,
because they are assumed to consume no foreign goods whatsoever. There is room for
generalization of the test here to allow for some uncertainty in the investors home-currency
consumer price index, but a different result seems unlikely.
18. Stulz (l98lb) and Errunza and Losq (1985) are examples of the theory and testing,
respectively, of segmented equity markets.
19. Many of the authors working on this subject have recently been brought together by
Claessens and Gooptu (1993).
3320. E.g., Eun andShim(1989),King and Wadwhani(1990) and von Furstenberg and Jeon
(1989). Shiller, Konya and Tsutsui (1991) conclude from a systematic study of
questionnaires that traders inthe crashwere responding in animmediate senseto news about
U.S.pricemovements per Se, not to news about economic fundamentals.
21. Engle, ItoandLin(1990) usethe term "meteor showers," to describevolatility clusters
that persist, not onlyfrom onetradingdayto the next, but fromone time zonetothenext.
22. Forexample, Bosner-Neal, Brauer, Neal and Wheatley (1990) and Diwan, Senbet and
Errunza (1993).
34